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Abstract: Although taxes have not generated the crisis, some aspects of tax policy may 
have led to increased risk-taking and indebtedness of banks, households and companies. 
Tax incentives may indeed the behavior of economic agents, leading them to wrong 
economic decisions. The aim of the paper is to review main channels through which the 
tax policy can affect financial markets and financial stability. Attention is focused on last 
and current development of tax reliefs for housing and capital gains, tax benefits for 
corporate debt financing and taxation of financial institutions Conventional scientific 
methods such as analysis, induction, comparison and synthesis are used in the paper.  
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1 Introduction  
There is a general consensus that the 2008 financial crisis is the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression of 1929. As Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (2010) mention, it 
has been characterized by a housing bubble in a context of rapid credit expansion, high 
risk-taking and exacerbated financial leverage, leading to deleveraging and credit crunch 
when the bubble burst. Economists and researchers have tried to identify causes which 
have caused or co-caused the crisis. This effort has a very simple and logical reason – 
identifying and understanding problems can help to prevent future crises. Lloyd (2009) 
emphasizes that root causes of the financial crisis can be identified at two levels: global 
liquidity policies (especially low interest rates in particular nurturing a strong credit 
expansion with cheap leverage and bubble tendencies in asset prices); plus a poor 
regulatory framework, which not only failed to prevent the growth of asset bubbles but 
actually contributed to their growth and concentration into the specific areas, such as 
mortgage securitization, where the credit bubble eventually burst with such damaging 
consequences. More immediate causes of the crisis can be categorized as follows: 
• a high appetite for yield and a high tolerance of risk; 
• lack of transparency; 
• insufficient regulation;  
• lack of adequate corporate and fiscal governance. 
The discussion has focused also on the tax policy and measures.  The complexities of 
national tax codes, and the international interaction between them encouraged the use of 
complicated financial instruments and international tax planning, reducing transparency. 
Slemrod (2009), Keen et al. (2010), Guily (2010), Ceriani et al. (2011) and others have 
tried to answer the question whether taxation and tax policy can play any role in 
precipitating the financial crisis. They have considered as the most important elements of 
the tax system affecting financial crisis: the tax preference for corporate debt financing, 
the taxation of financial institutions, tax competition, tax reliefs for housing and for 
capital gains, the incoherence of capital income taxation (tax arbitrage, tax clienteles, 
and derivative securities), the use of tax havens for creating tax efficient securitization 
instruments and the tax preference of the performance-based remuneration. 
The aim of the paper is to review main channels through which the tax policy can 
contribute to the crisis. Attention of the paper was focused (due to the length of the 
article) only on tax reliefs for housing and capital gains, tax benefits for corporate debt 
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financing and taxation of financial institutions. The paper examines development and also 
possible tax measures and regulation.  
The paper employs standard methods of scientific paper. In the theoretical part, mainly 
the methods of description and induction are used; next the methods of comparative 
analysis, deduction and synthesis will be applied. 
2 The Tax Treatment of Housing 
We start with the tax treatment of housing as housing, and in particular the collapse of 
the housing price bubble, has been singled out as a triggering cause of the crisis. Tax 
policy can affect two key aspects of housing markets: house prices and households’ 
leverage. These are interrelated, as high house prices encourage removing equity 
through increased borrowing, the availability of cheap loans drives up house prices, and 
the expectation of price increases raises the expected return on borrowing to acquire 
housing. There is a considerable diversity of housing tax regimes across countries.  
Definite international comparison is difficult due to the complexity of tax codes and 
differences in terms of deductions, exceptions or threshold limits. 
Study of IMF (2009) points out the risks in distorting a market so central to financial 
stability reinforce long-standing efficiency and equity arguments for more neutral 
taxation. Taxation of capital gains is needed to match the capital gains tax liability on 
other financial assets; and deductibility of mortgage interest is needed to match the 
taxation of the interest available from investing in other assets. From a theoretical point 
of view, the non-taxation of the rental return to owner-occupied housing, coupled with 
the deductibility of mortgage interest and home equity loan interest for itemizers and 
especially favorable statement of capital gains on housing, adds up to a substantial tax 
preference. Unfortunately, tax systems are not neutral. Owner-occupation is tax-favored 
with respect to renting in many countries, and with respect to most forms of return on 
personal savings.  
In practice, imputed rents and capital gains on primary residences are rarely taxed, 
creating a general bias towards housing that mortgage interest relief is likely to reinforce. 
Very few countries bring imputed rents into the income tax (the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Switzerland being exceptions). Some tax capital gains on owner-occupied housing, 
but typically more lightly than other income or only beyond a high threshold (or both). 
Even in the absence of distortions on the financing side, these features would tax-favor 
owner-occupation relative to renting. And mortgage interest costs attract tax relief, 
subject to limits, in a number of countries (e.g. Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Italy, 
France, U.S., UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Czech Republic). Since borrowing to acquire other 
assets is generally not deductible, this makes investment in housing even more favored. 
Look at Ceriani et al. (2011) or Taxes in Europe database for details. 
Mortgage interest relief would not tax-favor mortgage finance if the alternative to 
borrowing were investing less in fully-taxed assets and other interest were also 
deductible. If alternative investments were fully taxed, mortgage interest deductibility 
would mean that the opportunity costs of acquiring housing by borrowing and by running 
down other assets would in each case be the after-tax interest rate—so mortgage finance 
would not be tax -favored. Many countries, however, tax other forms of saving (such as 
pensions) at reduced rates. In that case, if the return on those assets matches the pre-
tax interest rate on mortgage debt, there is an arbitrage gain from leveraging against 
housing and investing own-funds in the non-housing asset. And while interest on loans 
used to finance consumption is generally not deductible, home equity loans have 
provided (within limits) just such a tax-favored way to borrow and spend. 
The distributional impact of mortgage interest relief can be complex, but deductibility 
likely favors the better off. Higher income individuals may be more likely to face 
constraints on their access to tax-favored assets (since this is often subject to caps), so 
that their opportunity cost of investing in housing is the after-tax return. This creates an 
argument for some tax relief to ensure that the less well-off also pay an after-tax rate. 
Against this, however, deductions are worth more to the better-off as they take them 
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against a higher marginal rate of tax. The second effect would be avoided if relief were 
provided—as many countries do—not as a deduction but as a credit. 
Noord and Heady (2001) and next Noord (2005) have stated that the deductibility of 
mortgage interest, by reducing the user cost of ownership, decreases the price elasticity 
of demand; it therefore increases the volatility of the housing market. In general, the 
price sensitivity of demand for housing is inversely related to the extent of preferential 
tax treatment for housing and to the expected rate of house price appreciation. 
Moreover, Keen et al. (2008) note that mortgage interest tax relief encourages the build-
up of gross housing debt and there is evidence that countries offering more favourable 
tax treatment for home ownership do indeed have higher ratios of mortgage debt. There 
is also evidence that mortgages fell significantly relative to home value (in UK and U.S.) 
after reforms reduced the value of mortgage interest relief (e.g. in Scandinavian 
countries). 
Ownership or occupation and transaction taxes also play an important role. Many 
countries charge substantial recurrent taxes based on ownership or occupation. These 
have potential appeal both in serving as user charges reflecting the value of local public 
services and, to the extent that these and other features are location-specific, as being 
less vulnerable to interjurisdictional tax competition than the corporate income tax and 
other taxes on more mobile bases. Johansson et al. (2008) have presented evidence that 
such taxes (along with consumption taxes) have significantly less adverse effects on 
growth than income taxation. Also Hilbers et al. (2008) have highlighted that economic 
activity somehow related to housing accounts for an important share of GDP. In Europe, 
this share is estimated at between 5 and 10 per cent. Next, Lutz et al. (2011) have 
identified five main channels through which the housing market affects public finances: 
property tax revenues, transfer tax revenues, sales tax revenues (including a direct 
effect through construction materials and an indirect effect through the link between 
housing wealth and consumption), and personal income tax revenues. They found that 
property tax revenues do not tend to decrease following house price declines and 
concluded that the resilience of property tax receipts is due to significant lags between 
market values and assessed values of housing and the tendency of policy makers to 
offset declines in the tax base with higher tax rates. The other four channels have had a 
relatively modest effect on state tax revenues and public finances. It is necessary to have 
on mind that a shortfall in public revenue may cause a debt problem.  
Moreover, investors paying tax on interest income at a rate higher than that at which 
they can offset capital losses benefit by pooling assets to pay interest at a rate which 
reflects the expected losses. Investors facing the same rate on both, on the other hand, 
do not care about the mix of interest and gains. Bringing the two types together creates 
scope for tax arbitrage from which both can benefit. Eddins (2009) developed this 
argument.  
The search for new ways to allocate risk has encouraged to the development of new 
financial instruments, in particular the technique of securitization. The most common 
securitizations (in relations to the housing) are mortgage-based securities (MBSs) 
whereby the claims of thousands of mortgages are pooled together in a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV), which is a legal entity outside of the balance-sheet of the financial 
institution, allowing them to bypass capital ratios regulations. Tax issues raised by 
securitization include: whether any gains on assets placed in the SPV by the originator 
are taxable; whether the SPV itself is taxable; and whether payments to holders of the 
securitized assets will be taxed as interest or dividends. MBSs can be divided between 
commercial MBSs (CMBSs), secured by commercial and multifamily properties, and 
residential MBSs (RMBSs).  
But IMF (2009) highlights that a lack of clarity in the tax treatment of new instruments 
can lead to further complexities through the use of strategies aimed at assuring tax 
minimization: one way to trying to ensure that SPVs themselves—which are just 
intermediating receipts —are not subject to additional layer of tax, for example, is by 
locating them in low-tax jurisdictions. 
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3 Tax Benefits for Corporate Debt Financing 
Tax is one of many determinants of corporate financial policies. Although the theory 
expects the existence of complete markets, perfect information, and no taxation, the 
reality is otherwise. Informational imperfections introduce considerations that can lead to 
a determinate choice and parceling of returns between equity and debt has real 
consequence. As Lloyd (2009) mentions, one longstanding issue is that there is an 
overall bias in many countries’ tax systems which work to encourage corporate leverage. 
Changes in investment patterns and cross-border financial flows brought about by the 
twin forces of globalization and financial innovation may have significantly increased the 
impact of this bias in recent years. A systemic bias in favor of corporates financing 
themselves with debt (as opposed to equity) results from treating interest as a business 
cost in arriving at corporate profits, and so deductible for tax purposes against annual 
corporate profits, while treating returns to equity finance as a distribution of corporate 
profits, and not deductible in computing those. As a result profits may be taxed both at 
corporate and personal level when they are distributed as dividends.  
According to Alworth and Arachi (2012), the greatest tax distortions in favor of debt 
financing will be in situations where there is no compensating increase in taxation at the 
level of the investor, compared with the taxation of dividends or capital gains on shares. 
Such a compensating increase could in theory arise if tax systems systematically 
compensated for the bias to corporate debt through reduced taxation of dividends and 
capital gains on shares. In practice, the distortion is greatest when the investor is tax 
exempt, or when tax is evaded, or when hybrid structures are used to achieve either a 
double deduction (“double dip”) for the interest expense or relief for the interest expense 
with no corresponding taxation. Double-dip financing is a tax-planning strategy in certain 
cases involving the use of conventional debt, depending on the effective tax rate on 
interest income in the home country, compared with the effective tax rate on profit in the 
host country. 
From a financial stability point of view, the key problem with high levels of leverage is 
that this makes companies more vulnerable to economic shocks and increases the 
probability of bankruptcy. Specifically, highly leveraged companies are particularly 
susceptible to volatility in profits (since they will be required to make interest payments 
irrespective of profitability) and–unless they have hedged–to volatility in currency or 
interest rates. If leverage levels become unsustainable and lead to a credit crunch, firms 
and households are left without access to the credit they need, leading to a collapse in 
demand. As the study of IMF (2009) concludes, this tax distortion has gained more 
attention recently as the crisis has highlighted the fact that many companies have too 
high leverage ratios. This could lead to liquidity constraints, especially in times when 
banks tend to restrict their credit supply. 
Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (2010) show that current corporate tax system in Europe 
favor debt financing over equity financing. While, in general, interest payments on 
corporate debt are deductible from the corporate tax base, return on equity is not. This 
leads to a higher leverage for firms since financing investments through debt is tax-
favored. This tax distortion has gained more attention recently as the crisis has 
highlighted the fact that many companies have too high leverage ratios. This could lead 
to liquidity constraints, especially in times when banks tend to restrict their credit supply.  
A well-designed tax base that reduces the distortion of the leverage could make 
companies less vulnerable to a short-term reduction in credits available on the capital 
market. There is indeed empirical evidence that the leverage of companies is indeed 
influenced by taxes. Several studies have analyzed this issue and find that debt policy is 
consistent with tax considerations (e.g. Desai et al., 2004 or Huizinga et al., 2008). 
Huizinga et al. (2008) have found for instance that for stand-alone companies, an 
increase in the effective tax rate by one percentage-point increases the ratio of debt to 
assets by 0.18%. The impact is larger for multinationals as it reaches 0.24% for two 
equal-size companies (with one foreign subsidiary) within the same group.  
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In principle, two opposing measures exist that might eliminate this distortion by treating 
both sources of finance in the same way: an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) or a 
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT). The ACE would grant a similar deduction for 
return on equity than for interest paid. This would abolish the tax advantage of debt. At 
the same time, ACE reduces the tax burden on marginal investment. ACE would also lead 
to a narrower tax base. In order to collect the same amount of tax revenue either the 
statutory corporate tax rate or other taxes have to be increased to finance such a reform. 
The CBIT, on the contrary, broadens the tax base by disallowing a deduction for interest 
payments on debt. If the tax rate remains unchanged, this leads to an increase in tax 
revenue. The additional revenue can be either used for a reduction in the statutory 
corporate tax rate or of other taxes if the reform is supposed to be revenue neutral. The 
tax neutrality of the financing decision is the same as in the ACE case since equity and 
debt financing are equally treated. ACE and CBIT have been discussed extensively in the 
economic literature as evidenced by Devereux and de Mooij (2009). Both systems are 
appealing due to their efficiency properties with regard to the financing decision of 
companies; however, there is no clear recommendation on which system is most 
favorable and there are key trade-offs when designing a reform towards any of these 
pure systems. While in the context of open economies ACE is more prone to profit 
shifting (in particular when its narrow tax base is accompanied by higher corporate tax 
rates), CBIT might lead to increased distortions of the marginal investment. 
Recently, Lierse (2012) has pointed on evidence of the tax bias to debt encouraging 
higher levels of gearing by companies, and banks have tended not only to gear up to the 
levels of debt allowed under regulatory capital rules but also to issue hybrid, equity-like, 
forms of debt, rather than ordinary share capital, where that satisfied both the regulators 
and the conditions for a tax deduction. 
We can find an unclear premise concerning the tax incentive to debt financing. Generally, 
it presumes that, in order to obtain the credit and thus tax advantages of interest 
deductibility, corporations must change the risk profile of their obligations to the 
providers of capital. This may not be true, though, if a corporation can obtain the tax 
advantages without altering the character of its obligations. In principle this could be 
done by issuing hybrid instruments such as convertible debt obligations. Moreover, 
Shaviro (2009) notes, corporations often favor hybrid financing that qualifies as debt for 
tax but not for accounting purposes, thereby generating deductions against taxable 
income but not against financial statement earnings. 
4 The Taxation of Financial Institutions 
Although James Tobin first conceived the Financial Transaction Tax over 40 years ago, 
wider discussions about a possible taxation of the financial institutions has appeared after 
the financial crisis in 2008. According to Alworth and Arachi (2011), financial institutions 
face qualitatively the same tax considerations in balancing equity and debt finance as 
non-financial corporations. Banks have traditionally been able to sustain very high debt 
ratios by virtue of having relatively safe assets, and implicit or explicit deposit guarantees 
reinforce this. Besides, the high profitability of financial institutions in recent years will 
have made debt more attractive for them than for many non-financials, since the low 
probability of tax exhaustion it implies means a high effective corporate income tax rate. 
IMF (2009) has presented the tax bias to debt runs counter to regulatory objectives. 
Banks face both an explicit tax advantage of debt and, through regulatory requirements, 
an implicit penalty—with evident risk of policy incoherence. Tax incentives towards high 
leverage may have undercut the effectiveness of regulatory requirements. The tension 
between regulatory objectives is reflected in the emergence of already mentioned hybrid 
financial instruments, which are treated like debt obligations for tax purposes (i.e., 
interest payments are deductible), but they are treated as capital rather than liabilities 
under banking regulations.  
Hasman et al. (2011) have analyzed the effectiveness of different government policies to 
prevent the emergence of banking crises. They have studied the impact on welfare of 
using tax-payers money to recapitalize banks, government injection of money into the 
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banking system through credit lines, the creation of a buffer and taxes on financial 
transactions (the Tobin tax). Whilst the Tobin tax is an emergency policy (applied when a 
banking crisis is imminent), the creation of a buffer is a preventive one. 
Acharya et al. (2011) have stressed the negative externalities of large, complex financial 
institutions and recommended that policy makers quantify their systemic risk and tax 
their contributions to this risk. Systemic risk can be broadly thought of as the failure of a 
significant part of the financial sector –one large institution or many smaller ones – 
leading to a reduction in credit availability that has the potential to adversely affect the 
real economy. As stated by Slemrod (2009) the tax should be implemented through 
capital requirements or deposit insurance fees, rather than by trying to apply a tax 
directly to a base associated with the negative externality. 
European Commission also has focused its attention on a possible taxation of the 
financial sector and has concluded that EU should introduce a system of levies or taxes 
on financial institution. On September 28, 2011, the European Commission formally 
proposed a plan to implement an EU-wide financial transactions tax (EC, 2011).  In 
October 2012, after discussions failed to establish unanimous support for an EU-wide 
financial transactions tax (FTT), the European Commission proposed that the use of 
enhanced cooperation should be permitted to implement the tax in the states which 
wished to participate. The proposal, supported by 11 EU member states representing 
more than 90% of Eurozone GDP. The European Parliament resoundingly approved the 
plan in December 2012. On February 14, 2013 the European Commission adopted a 
proposal for an 11-nation financial transactions tax and it will come into force after being 
approved by the participating member states and the European Parliament. The target 
starting date is January 1, 2014 (EC, 2013).  
The tax would be levied on all transactions on financial instruments between financial 
institutions when at least one party to the transaction is located in the EU. It would cover 
85% of the transactions between financial institutions (banks, investment firms, 
insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds and others), but not affect citizens and 
businesses. House mortgages, bank loans to small and medium enterprises, contributions 
to insurance contracts, as well as spot currency exchange transactions and the raising of 
capital by enterprises or public bodies through the issuance of bonds and shares on the 
primary market would not be taxed, with the exception of trading bonds on secondary 
markets. 
The European Commission itself expects the FTT to have the following impact on financial 
markets and the real economy:  
 up to a 90 per cent reduction in derivatives transactions; 
 negative or positive effect on economic growth;  
 an effective curb on automated high-frequency trading and highly leveraged 
derivatives; 
 an increase in capital costs, which could be mitigated by excluding primary 
markets for bonds and shares from the tax 
 the real economy could be protected by ensuring the tax is levied only on 
secondary financial products, thus not affecting transactions such as salary 
payments, corporate and household loans (Hagelüken, 2012) . 
However, there is not unambiguous consent that FTT on its own would prevent financial 
crises. The authors like Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) argue that FTT would 
somewhat reduce systemic risk, and therefore the likelihood of future crises, as prudent 
macroeconomic policies and effective financial regulation as well as supervision also have 
a major role to play in crisis prevention. However, by significantly reducing the level of 
noise trading in general and reducing (or eliminating) high frequency trading in 
particular, the FTT would make some contribution to the reduction of severe 
misalignments and hence the probability of violent adjustments. Moreover, in financial 
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crises “gross” exposures matter more than the net ones, and financial transaction taxes 
will reduce the gap between the two.  
Conclusions 
The aim of the paper was to review the main channels through which the tax policy can 
contribute to the crisis. We can conclude that the most important elements of the tax 
system affecting financial crisis are: the tax benefits for corporate debt financing, the 
taxation of financial institutions, tax competition, tax reliefs for housing and capital gains, 
the incoherence of capital income taxation like tax arbitrage, tax clienteles and derivative 
securities, the use of tax havens for creating tax efficient securitization instruments and 
the tax prioritization of the performance-based remuneration. 
There is evidence that the tax system played a major role in triggering the tax crisis. On 
the other side, a number of special taxes have been introduced and proposed to recover 
the cost of the ―bailout. There is a bias that in many countries tax systems encourage 
corporate leverage. Changes in investment patterns and cross-border financial flows 
brought about by the twin forces of globalization and financial innovation may have 
significantly increased the impact of this bias in recent years. A systemic bias in favor of 
corporates financing themselves with debt results from treating interest as a business 
cost in arriving at corporate profits, and so deductible for tax purposes against annual 
corporate profits, while treating returns to equity finance as a distribution of corporate 
profits, and not deductible in computing those. As a result profits may be taxed both at 
corporate and personal level when they are distributed as dividends. 
The debate has highlighted that taxation may be used as corrective instrument to 
complement prudential regulation of the banking sector. Financial  transaction  tax  has 
been adopted as  a  tool  to  stabilize  financial markets  and  improve  their  functioning  
because a large number of transactions are either speculative or of no social use.  
It should be stressed that many of the defining elements of the pre-crisis financial sector 
were global in scope. The main root causes of the crisis, e.g. cross-border debt balances, 
exploitation of differences in regulation and in market prices and the market for the 
highest-yielding investments, were also global. In spite of that, there is a tension 
between global integration of markets and nationally based regulation. But in a globally 
competitive market, market players will seek the most advantageous regulatory 
environment for financial transactions and exploit differences in national regulations, so 
the regulatory activities must also be global. 
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